Our Responsibility Towards Animals by Daiana Vasquez

A lot has been written in the philosophical as well as the scientific field increasing the debate on how we can establish the grounds for our responsibility towards animals. The discussion, for instance, on whether or not animals are moral actors is motivated by the need to give responsibility towards animals a solid basis, protecting them, namely, against arbitrary experiments. So, if they are moral actors, they should also be a target of moral action. That means, in other terms, that they could not be merely used as objects. The question to be raised is, however, if we do need rational arguments to ground this responsibility for means of protecting the animals.

One of these rational arguments is, as exemplified above, the one that sets for animals a moral status. Stating that animals are moral actors means, among other things, that they are capable of making decisions on moral issues; that they are conscious of the consequences of their decision upon others. This is a very strong claim, since there are no proofs at all for it. On the contrary, available evidence indicates that animals do not decide based on moral criteria but on their so-called natural instincts. It is very problematic attempting to constitute our responsibility towards animals on an assumption that is barely accepted. Besides, there are other ways to pursue the ambition of finding the grounds of our responsibility towards them, avoiding statements that can be easily contested. What is this rational argument good for, if it is so controversial? And being controversial, it does not seem to found the desired solid basis for animal protection.

Other rational arguments are the ones based on equality or on the intrinsic value of the animal. Both are also not totally uncontroversial. In any case, they all lead to the same result: we should treat animals respectfully, because there is a rational comprehensible reason for doing so that we can not ignore.

On the other hand, we have arguments standing for our responsibility towards animals that can not be merely considered as rational, for example arguments that are based on our love or compassion (see more on this, for example on the website of Animal Freedom). These appeal to our sentimentality, although rationality is also here not forgotten. There is a link between loving the animal and having to treat it right. By ‘treat right’ here, I mean more than the commitment of not abusing it, but also to actively take care of it. This link can just be made through rational arguments such as: we must take care of the one we love. Although not purely rational, these arguments still stay on the level of justification.

People are struggling to find the “right” foundations on our responsibility towards animals; as if – at least this is the feeling that rises in me – we would not act respectfully towards them without knowing exactly why we act like this. Presupposing that we respect them, do we really need an explanation for that? Presupposing that there are those who not only do not care about animals but also abuse them – and unfortunately they exist -, can we convince these people to change their behavior based on a theory that - for now and forever - should provide us with the grounds of this responsibility?

Contrasting these points of view, I state that we neither need the “pure” nor the “partial” rational arguments to treat animals with dignity or to convince other people to do the same. (Similar thoughts, by the way, can be found in a book from Raymond Gaita called The Philosopher’s Dog).

First, we can definitely trust our intuition on the matter of why it is right to treat animals with dignity. To trust our intuition is what we are automatically doing everyday, every time we make a decision. Why should it be different in this case? Besides, I would say that people who abuse animals know “intuitively” that they are doing something wrong.

Second, in the case of the ones abusing animals neither our or their intuitions nor well-formulated rational theories will change their behavior. If they wish, for any reason, to abuse animals, theories are not worthy to convince them of the contrary; instead, there are legal mechanisms to control them – at least in countries where society stands for animal protection.

Nevertheless we can, of course, always try to convince people that respecting and taking care of animals is better than ignoring or abusing them. But this does not mean that the convincing process must be a rationally based one, since there are other ways of convincing, often much more effective. Be a living example!